In the philosophical literature, the universality of macro-behavior is typically interpreted in terms of the multiple realizability of a kind of macrobehavior. To take one prominent example, Batterman interprets RG explanations as meeting the "challenge of multiple realizability": "How can systems that are heterogeneous at some (typically) micro-scale exhibit the same pattern of behavior at the macro-scale?" (Batterman 2015: 8) . The challenge of multiple realizability encoded in Batterman's why-question goes back to Fodor's famously scandalizing way of articulating the request for an explanation of the fact that there is multiply realized macro-behavior: 2 The critical exponent typically figures in an equation describing the order parameter of the physical systems in question (that is, a macroscopic physical quantity such as magnetization), in relation to the so-called reduced temperature.
"Damn near everything we know about the world suggests that unimaginably complicated to-ings and fro-ings of bits and pieces at the extreme micro-level manage somehow to converge on stable macro-level properties. […] [T]he 'somehow', really is entirely mysterious […] why there should be (how there could be) macro level regularities at all in a world where, by common consent, macro level stabilities have to supervene on a buzzing, blooming confusion of micro level interactions." (Fodor 1997: 161) Fodor demands an explanation for how it is possible that multiply realized macro-regularities obtain given the "confusion of micro level interactions". Following Fodor's approach, Batterman, by and large, equates universality and multiple realizability in stating that the explanandum of RG explanations is why a certain macroscopic property is multiply realized (Batterman 2000: 117; 2002: 72; 2015: 8) .
How do RG explanations account for multiply realized or universal macro-behavior? Without going into the details of RG explanations for now (see section 3 for a brief exposition of the physics of RG explanations), one obvious and abstract answer might be that universality is explained by that fact that (a) microscopically different systems S 1 and S 2 exhibiting the same macro-behavior have a property in common, although they are very different in many respects, and that (b) this shared property helps to explain the fact that S 1 and S 2 display the same macro-behavior near criticality. Let me call this general explanatory strategy the 'commonality strategy'. Batterman ascribes the commonality strategy to Papineau: "For Papineau, the reducibility of some special science property to physics requires 'only that there should be some physical property present in all and only [the distinct realizers of the special science property]. The presence of such a common property will then provide 'a uniform physical explanation of why those instances always give rise to a certain sort of result' (Papineau [1993] , p. 35)." (Batterman 2000: 135-136) Papineau illustrates the commonality strategy as follows. Taking thermodynamic behavior as a paradigmatic example of multiply realized macro-behavior in physics, Papineau asks how it is possible that microscopically different gases obey the ideal gas law: "After all, aren't there lots of different ways in which the molecules can be moving around in a gas at a given temperature, thus giving us a heterogeneity of physical states for the single macro-state of having that temperature?" (Papineau 1993: 35) . Papineau answers that this case of multiple realizability -like many other cases -can be explained by applying the commonality strategy:
here is still something physically in common between all those different physical states, namely, that the molecules have a given mean kinetic energy. It is this commonality that then enables us to explain such things as why an increase in temperature at constant volume always results in an increase in pressure." (ibid.) In other words, Papienau holds that microscopically different gases share a property -their mean kinetic energy. This property helps to explain why microscopically different gases display the same macro-behavior which is captured by the ideal gas law. This is a paradigmatic instance of the commonality strategy.
It is worth emphasizing right away that (a) the mean kinetic energy provides an explanation of the macro-behavior at issue only in concert with other theoretical resources of statistical mechanics (including bridge laws, statistical principles, and the general dynamical laws of classical mechanics), and that (b) these other theoretical resources of statistical mechanics are applicable to microscopically very different physical systems. I will return to this point in Section 4.
One may add to Papineau's presentation of the example that the statistical-mechanical explanation of the ideal gas law he refers to is not merely available for addressing how various (actual or possible) micro states of one and the same gas made up of the same molecules give rise to a certain macrobehavior (the case Papineau explicitly discusses), but the statistical-mechanical explanation also illuminates why different micro states of two (or more) gases made up of different kinds of molecules may display the same kind of macrobehavior.
However, Batterman claims that RG explanations "differ significantly in kind from Papineau's explanation of the temperature/pressure relation" (Batterman 2000: 136) . Batterman argues that RG explanations do not follow the commonality strategy: "my point has been that the RG account explains the universality of critical phenomena without finding any such property" (ibid.; emphasis added). Batterman also endorses the same argument in more recent work (Batterman 2002 (Batterman : 72-73, 2015 Batterman and Rice 2014: 373) .
Let me briefly pause to add a disclaimer. For Batterman, the claim that the commonality strategy does not apply to RG explanations plays a role in a larger argument for the failure of reduction in the context of RG explanations (see Batterman 2000 Batterman , 2002 Batterman , 2015 . In this paper, I will not be concerned with the question whether a defense of the commonality strategy with respect to RG explanation supports reductionism (see Reutlinger 2014b for a discussion of the reductive character of RG explanations). My sole aim is to argue that RG explanations, interesting and unusual as they may be in other respects, are not special when it comes to following the commonality strategy for explaining multiply realized macro-behavior.
The Core Elements of RG Explanations
How do physicists explain the remarkable fact that there is universal macrobehavior by using RG explanations? My strategy in this section is to focus on the physics of RG explanations. The following brief exposition of the relevant physics will be non-technical because the paper is concerned with a nontechnical question (Batterman 2000: 137-144 ; for a more technical exposition see Fisher 1982 Fisher , 1998 Wilson 1983; McComb 2004 ).
Since it is not relevant for my argument in this paper, I will not attempt to provide a discussion of which philosophical theory of explanation applies to RG explanations (for instance, Butterfield 2011 and Norton 2012 favor a coveringlaw approach to RG explanations, while Reutlinger forthcoming argues that a counterfactual theory of scientific explanation applies to RG explanations). For present purposes, I will simply assume that some philosophical theory of explanation adequately captures the explanatory character of RG explanations.
For the sake of brevity, it is useful to understand the workings of RG explanations as consisting of three key elements: Interestingly, these different Hamiltonians "flow" to a fixed point in the space of possible Hamiltonians, which describes a specific behavior characterized by a critical exponent (Batterman 2000: 143) . Now suppose there is another fluid F* and its behavior (during phase transition) is described by the initial Hamiltonian H*. Repeatedly applying the RG transformation to H* generates other, more 'coarse-grained' Hamiltonians. If the Hamiltonians representing fluid F* and fluid F turn out to "flow" to the same fixed point, then their behavior, when undergoing phase transition, is characterized by the same critical exponent (Fisher 1982: 85; Batterman 2000: 143) .
In sum, these three elements of RG explanations allow us to determine whether systems with different original Hamiltonians belong to the same "universality class" and are characterized by the same critical exponent (Fisher 1982: 87) .
Two systems belong to the same universality class, if reiterating RG transformations reveals that both systems "flow" to the same fixed point.
Defending the Commonality Strategy
Now, let me turn to the central question: are RG explanations in accord with the commonality strategy for explaining the occurrence of universal (or multiply realized) macro-behavior? I believe the answer is 'yes', because RG explanations enable us to understand two things: first, they reveal that systems with different micro-structures (represented by different 'original' Hamiltonians) belong to the same universality class. Second, RG explanations also show that and why some systems with different micro-structures in fact belong to different universality classes. RG explanations reveal that whether a physical system belongs to some universality class depends on features such as the symmetry properties of the order parameter (such as magnetization) and the spatial dimensionality of the physical system in question (Fischer 1998: 675; see also Fischer 1982; Wilson 1983; Cardy 1996; McComb 2004) . This response falls short of being a convincing criticism of the commonality strategy. First and foremost, it strikes me as uncharitable to read Papineau's idea that multiple realization is explained by reference to a "physical property present in all and only" the microscopically different physical systems exhibiting the same macro-behavior as the claim that this common property also has to be sufficient for explaining the macro-behavior in question. Moreover, the requirement that the common properties be sufficient for explaining the macrobehavior is unnecessarily strong and an advocate of the commonality strategy need not accept it. Even if properties such as spatial dimensionality and the symmetry properties of the order parameter alone are not sufficient for explaining universal behavior, this fact does not highlight a difference between mechanical explanation of the ideal gas law. Mean kinetic energy alone is also not sufficient for explaining the macro-behavior described by the ideal gas law (a point I already mentioned in Section 2). Instead, a bridge law 4 connecting mean kinetic energy and temperature, statistical principles, and the general ( However, the commonality strategy fortunately allows for vast microscopic differences among the physical systems exhibiting the same macro-behavior. 
